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Abstract: Union representation has been in strong decline in most OECD coun-
tries with potentially important consequences for wages. What drives this decline?
We try to answer this question by developing and implementing a detailed decom-
position approach based on Fairlie (2005). Using linked employer-employee data
from the German Structure of Earnings Survey for 2001 and 2006, we document a
sharp drop in collective bargaining coverage that amounts to 17 percentage points
for males and 20 percentage points for females in West, and eight and 14 percent-
age points, respectively, in East Germany. We find that neither changes in the
characteristics nor changes in the coefficients associated with the characteristics as
a whole provide an explanation for the drop in collective bargaining coverage. The
drop in coverage is the result of an unexplained time trend.
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1 Introduction
Union representation has been in strong decline in most OECD countries (Visser,
2006; Lesch, 2004; OECD, 2004; Card et al., 2003; Schnabel, 2013). It is interesting
to see that the same trend affects countries with very different institutional set-ups
such as the USA, Canada, the UK, and Germany.1 This trend may have important
consequences. In particular, it may result in lower wage levels and growing wage
inequality because unions tend to compress the wage distribution from below.2 Ger-
many is an interesting case to study because it underwent a remarkable transition
from the being considered the“sick man”of Europe to experiencing a“jobs miracle”
(European Comission, 2002; Krugman, 2009; Mo¨ller, 2010; Dustmann et al., 2014).
In Germany, collective agreements dominate the entire process of setting working
conditions – not only for union members.
Collective wage agreements in Germany define minimum working standards not
only for union members but typically for all employees of a covered establishment.
Therefore, coverage rates are much higher than membership rates and more rele-
vant for assessing the range of union representation in the labour market. Just like
union membership has dropped, also the share of employees covered by a collective
bargaining agreement has also dropped sharply.3 According to Ellguth and Kohaut
(2004, 2014) this share dropped from 70% in 2003 to 60% in 2013 (also see Addison
et al., 2010, Antonczyk, Fitzenberger, Sommerfeld, 2010). The strongest decline
in coverage on a year-to-year basis seems to have occurred during the first half of
the 2000s which is the period we investigate in this paper. Our study analyses the
trend during the early 2000s by means of a statistical decomposition analysis. Can
1See e.g. Card et al. (2003, 2004); Fitzenberger et al. (2011); Addison et al. (2010, 2011);
Schnabel (2013).
2See for literature on the US: Card (1996, 2001); Card et al. (2003, 2004) and for the German
case: Fitzenberger, Kohn and Lembcke (2013), Antonczyk, Fitzenberger and Sommerfeld (2010),
Burda et al. (2008); Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005); Gerlach and Stephan (2006).
3In West Germany, union density among employees dropped from about 30% in 1985 to 20%
in 2003 (Fitzenberger et al., 2011, p. 162). For Germany as a whole, Schnabel (2013) reports a
continuous decline in union density from 31.2% in 1990, to 24.6% in 2000, and to 18.6% in 2010.
A further dimension relates to the membership of firms in employer associations, which reach
collective agreements together with unions. Schnabel and Wagner (1996) report for the 1990’s
that about 50% of all firms covering about two thirds of all employees in the private sector of
the state of Lower Saxony are member in an employer association. Little is known as to whether
membership of firms in employer associations has fallen over time.
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changes in the composition of the workforce explain this trend (i.e. a characteris-
tics effect)? Or were there large changes in the propensity to work in a covered
establishment for certain employee groups (i.e. a coefficients effect)? Or is this a
trend that affects all groups of employees alike?
A large part of the variation in collective bargaining coverage is explained by sector
affiliation (Fitzenberger et al., 2011; Antonczyk et al., 2010). Thus, the currently
observed sectoral shift from manufacturing to services could potentially drive collec-
tive bargaining coverage down. Also, collective bargaining coverage varies substan-
tially with firm size (Biebeler and Lesch, 2007; Fitzenberger et al., 2011). Further,
age and tenure of an individual employee are positively related with the likelihood
of working in a covered establishment. Educational upskilling could reduce union
representation over time if higher skilled employees tend to work in non-covered
establishments. Further determinants of union membership include risk aversion
(Goerke and Pannenberg, 2012) and political attitudes (Biebeler and Lesch, 2007;
Fitzenberger et al., 2011; Schnabel and Wagner, 2007).
A few studies have decomposed the drop in union representation over time in Ger-
many, as measured by the drop in union membership (Fitzenberger et al., 2011;
Addison et al., 2011; Schnabel and Wagner, 2007). Following the decomposition ap-
proach for limited dependent variables introduced by Fairlie (2005), they conclude
that changes in the composition of the workforce are not the main driving force of
the drop in membership. Rather, the residual effect looms large which contains the
changing associations between the covariates and collective bargaining coverage as
well as the impact of unobservables.
Our analysis tries to determine in a statistical sense the mechanism through which
the reduction in coverage operates. This paper adds to the literature by devel-
oping a detailed decomposition approach and applying it to decompose changes
in collective bargaining coverage rather than union membership over time. This
approach allows separating out the effects of first individual characteristics, second
firm characteristics and third industry branch. Also, within the residual effect the
method allows separating the effect of a change in the different coefficients from
unexplained changes over time. This approach builds on Fairlie (2005) and extends
it to distinguish sequentially the contribution the contribution of certain groups of
characteristics. This is similar to the approach in Antonczyk et al. (2010, 2009) or
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more generally in DiNardo et al. (1996) for the case of continuous dependent vari-
ables. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to sequentially decompose
the drop in union representation.
The second contribution lies in the analysis of union coverage instead of union mem-
bership. We use the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES), a large and
reliable linked employer-employee data set provided by the Research Data Centres
of the German Statistical Office. Previous studies on Germany have often used
either ALLBUS or SOEP data for union membership or the IAB establishment
panel for firm-level analyses. The ALLBUS and the SOEP provide no information
on union coverage at the individual or firm level. The IAB establishment panel in-
volves union coverage at the establishment level, information which is self-reported
by a firm representative and which has been used in a number of studies for Ger-
many. The GSES data also provides information on coverage at the establishment
level, which is arguably more precise than the information in the IAB establish-
ment panel, because the GSES is based on personnel records of the establishment
sent directly to the Federal Statistical Office. In this study, almost 1,500,000 full-
time employees will be analysed for the years 2001 and 2006. We argue that this
time frame is interesting because it is the time during which the German labour
market underwent a strong transformation and labour market conditions improved
considerably. During the same time, wage inequality increased strongly and the
drop in coverage was particularly strong (as measured on an annual basis). Also,
considering the time period from 2001 to 2006 leaves out potential effects from the
great recession starting in 2007.
Admittedly, the GSES involve less information at the individual level or at the
establishment level compared to some of the aforementioned data sets, respectively.
Union membership may be associated with employee characteristics (Fitzenberger
et al., 2011; Addison et al., 2011; Schnabel and Wagner, 2007), which are not
recorded in the GSES. The decline in union membership precedes the decline in
union coverage but the two may be related. For instance, unions may find it
harder to organize new establishments if membership is low. Thus, a decline in
membership may result in a decline of coverage later on. Establishments under
distress may opt to drop out of collective bargaining agreements (Addison et al.,
2010; Dustmann et al., 2014). Thus, a drop in coverage may be associated with
indicators of the development of the establishment over time (e.g. profits, firm
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growth) and a weak labor market (e.g. as measured by the local unemployment
rate) may be a general indicator of distress (Gu¨rtzgen, 2015). Thus, an analysis
based on the GSES should be viewed as a complement rather than a substitute, on
the one hand, to the analysis of union membership based on the SOEP or ALLBUS
and, on the other hand, to a panel analysis of union coverage based on the IAB
establishment panel (possibly augmented by information on individual employees
from social security records). The advantages of our analysis based on the GSES
are the large sample size and the highly reliable information provided based on
personnel records of the establishments. The large sample size of the GSES allows
for a detailed sequential decomposition analysis.
Our results based on the GSES show that collective bargaining dropped sharply
over the period from 2001 to 2006. While for male employees in West Germany,
the drop in the share of employees who work in a covered establishment amounts to
about 17 percentage points (ppoints), for West German females the drop amounts
to nearly 20 ppoints! For East Germany, the drop in collective bargaining amounts
to 8 ppoints for male and 14 ppoints for female employees. The decomposition
results show very clearly that only a minor part of the drop in collective bargaining
coverage can be explained by the characteristics or their corresponding coefficients,
in both West and East Germany. We interpret the complex pattern in East Ger-
many as the results of the ongoing structural adjustment process there. Both for
West and East Germany, the drop in coverage is the result of an unexplained time
trend. This means that the drop in collective bargaining coverage is not confined to
certain industry sectors, to firms of a certain size nor to certain educational groups.
The rest of this article is structured as follows: The next section briefly explains the
German institutions that concern collective bargaining. Next, section 3 develops
the methodology starting out from the existing decomposition for limited dependent
variables and extending it to a sequential decomposition for our case. Then, section
4 describes the data used and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the results.
Finally, section 6 concludes. An additional appendix provides further details on
the empirical analysis.
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2 Institutional Background and Literature
Collective bargaining agreements in Germany are generally negotiated between an
employers’ association and a union. As an alternative to these forms of collective
negotiation, employers and employees can negotiate individual contracts. When
a collective agreement is achieved, it applies to all firms who form part of the
corresponding employers’ association and who operate in the relevant sector and
region. On the side of the employees, legally, the collective contract only needs to
be applied to union members. However, it is very common that employers pay all
employees according to the collective contract.4 This is because employers want to
reduce negotiation costs and to reduce the incentive to become a union member
(Fitzenberger et al., 2011). For this reason, collective bargaining coverage is much
higher and more relevant than union membership in Germany (Fitzenberger et al.,
2013).
The bargaining process can take place on the sectoral or on the firm level, so as
to reach more or less centralised results. Sectoral agreements apply to all estab-
lishments in the corresponding sector and region and may have to accommodate
very different firms in terms of e.g. size and profitability. Meanwhile firm-level
agreements can be tailored much more specifically to the single employer. For this
reason, it was expected that the firms’ need for flexibility might lead to a situation
in which the drop in sectoral bargaining is accompanied by a rise in firm bargaining.
However, this could not be confirmed empirically (Antonczyk et al., 2010). Rather,
the literature finds a stagnation or only a small drop in firm-level bargaining, for
both West and East Germany (Ellguth and Kohaut, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2012,
2013, 2014). Therefore, and because both types of collective bargaining are rather
similar, we will not further differentiate between these two types of agreements.
Of course, employers are always free to pay higher wages or premia than the collec-
tive agreement requires them to (“favourableness principle”or“Gu¨nstigkeitsprinzip”
Bosch, 2004). But they may not undercut the collective agreement.5 In this sense,
4Active discrimination against non-members is forbidden (“Negative Koalitionsfreiheit”), i.e.
closed shop or discrimination clauses are forbidden.
5One exception that has recently gained importance is opening clauses or hardship clauses
which allow lower wages or higher working hours under certain restrictive conditions (Heinbach,
2005, 2006; Heinbach and Schro¨pfer, 2007; Garloff and Gu¨rtzgen, 2011; Dustmann et al., 2014).
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collective agreements define minimum working standards for all employees working
in a covered establishment (also see Fitzenberger et al., 2013). For this reason, our
measure of collective bargaining coverage will reflect whether or not an employee
works in an establishment that is covered by collective bargaining (as in Antonczyk
et al., 2010).6
Finally, the contracts of individually contracted employees often explicitly or im-
plicitly refer to a collective agreement. Put differently, some firms that are not part
of an employers’ association and for whom the application of a collective agreement
is not binding, may still use a collective agreement as a benchmark in their wage
setting (“Bezugnahme-Klausel” Hold, 2003, p. 478). Although the application of a
collective contract comes into effect voluntarily from the employer’s side, they may
come to be legally binding under certain conditions (Hold, 2003). Among those
employees who work in establishments that are not covered by collective bargaining
directly, about half work in establishments that still use the collective contract for
orientation (Ellguth and Kohaut, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014; Addi-
son et al., 2015). For the reasons discussed here, coverage by collective agreements
is likely to exceed membership in an employer association (Schnabel and Wagner,
1996).
While this “orientation” towards a collective agreement is of large relevance among
German employers, it is naturally difficult to find any precise numbers on its dis-
tribution. These numbers are not recorded in the data set that we use. What we
will use later in this study is whether or not an employee works in an establishment
that is covered by collective bargaining.
What is the extent of union coverage in Germany? Ellguth and Kohaut (2004,
2007, 2014) report a share of covered employees of 70% for West Germany for the
year 2003 which dropped to 65% in 2006 and further declined to 60% in 2013. For
East Germany, the coverage rate on the employee level was at 54% in 2003 and
47% in 2013 (Ellguth and Kohaut, 2004, 2014). Their results are based on the IAB
6Due to“monopoly representation of industrial unionism”(Hassel, 2007, p. 178) only one union
per establishment is allowed to represent all employees. The legal German term is “Grundsatz
der Tarifeinheit”, see Hold, 2003. Thus, during the time period of our analysis, there may be at
most one collective contract per establishment and competition of unions or of different collective
contracts is ruled out. The situation has changed in the late 2000’s and small, occupation-specific
unions play a bigger role today. Today, it is possible to have different collective wage agreements
in one firm, which is the issue in the 2014/2015 labor dispute at Deutsche Bahn.
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establishment panel and differences to the results obtained from the GSES data
are likely due to different response behaviour or different data selection. Based on
the same data set, Addison et al. (2010) report a drop of coverage at the employee
level from 64.1% in 2000 to 55.8% in 2008 for the whole of Germany.
Naturally, data on coverage at the establishment level reveals very different shares
because coverage is strongly related to the size of the establishment. Coverage
at the establishment level was reported to be at 48.1% in West Germany in 2000
(Schnabel et al., 2006). When only establishments with ten or more employees are
considered, this share increases to 61.7% (ibid.). Meanwhile, Addison et al. (2011)
report a drop from 62.5% in 1998 to 51.1% in 2004, whereas Addison et al. (2010)
report coverage shares of 49.9% in 2000 and 38.1% in 2008 for entire Germany.
Again, it seems that different data sets obtain different coverage shares but they
uniformly describe a clear drop. This very sharp drop is to be explained by the
following decomposition approach.
A similar picture emerges based on union membership rates which are at a much
lower level due to the institutional set-up in Germany as explained above. Fitzen-
berger et al. (2011) report membership rates of 29.9% in 1985, 26.7% (37.3%) in
1993 and 20.0% (17.5%) in 2003 for West (East) Germany. Based on a different
data base, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) reports 32.7% in 1980, 28.7% in 1992, and
21.7% in 2004 for West Germany. For Germany as a whole, Schnabel (2013) re-
ports 24.6% for 2000 and 18.6% for 2010. Irrespective of the data source, all studies
confirm a strong drop in union membership.
What explains the drop in union representation? The reduction in the employment
rates of full time employees, males, and blue collar workers was expected to lead
to a reduction in union membership (Schnabel and Wagner, 2007). By a similar
composition argument, the shift in the industry structure towards the service sector
was expected to go along with lower union representation because establishments
in the service sector are less frequently covered by collective bargaining than in the
manufacturing sector (Hassel, 2007). Moreover, firms which become more exposed
to international competition may have a growing need for flexibility and might
therefore leave the system of collective bargaining (Kohaut and Bellmann, 1997;
Bosch, 2004). However, in contrast to these considerations, recent empirical studies
do not confirm the expected role of changes in the composition of the workforce
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(Schnabel and Wagner, 2007; Fitzenberger et al., 2011; Addison et al., 2011). The
two decomposition analyses by Fitzenberger et al. (2011) and Schnabel and Wagner
(2007) show that changes in the composition of the workforce – as captured by the
characteristics effect in a decomposition following Fairlie (2005) – explain little or
hardly anything of the drop in union membership. Instead, Schnabel and Wagner
(2007) attribute more than 90% of the drop in union membership to a residual
effect which they do not interpret any further. We are aware of only one study
that decomposes changes in collective bargaining coverage in Germany which is by
Addison et al. (2011). However, this study uses an Oaxaca (1973)-Blinder (1973)
type of decomposition which ignores the non-linearity of the dependent variable.
The authors find that changes in the coefficients fully explain the drop in collective
bargaining coverage and interpret these as behavioural changes.
The present study adds to this literature in two ways. First, we analyse union
coverage rather than union membership because this may be the more relevant
measure for outcomes like wages. Second, we extend the decomposition approach
by Fairlie (2005) to consider in detail the separate contributions of different sets of
covariates. This way we address the research question to which extent changes in
the composition of first individual characteristics, second firm characteristics and
third industry branch have affected the drop in collective bargaining coverage. At
the same time, we separate the effects of changes in the three corresponding sets
of coefficients from each other and from the residual effect. This methodology is
what we turn to next.
3 Methodology
Several decomposition procedures have been developed in order to decompose
changes in some dependent variable into parts that are attributable to changes in
characteristics or in coefficients. The original approach by Oaxaca (1973) and Blin-
der (1973) applies to the linear regression case. However, when studying changes
in collective bargaining coverage, the dependent variable is binary and thus a non-
linear parametric model is required. For this case Fairlie (1999, 2005) develops a
decomposition approach on which this study builds.
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We want to decompose changes in collective bargaining coverage over time. Adapt-
ing Fairlie’s method to our application, the decomposition reads:
(1)
Y¯2006 − Y¯2001 =

N
06∑
i=1
F (X06βˆ06)
N06
−
N06∑
i=1
F (X06βˆ01)
N06


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Residual
+

N
06∑
i=1
F (X06βˆ01)
N06
−
N01∑
j=1
F (X01βˆ01)
N01


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Characteristics
where X is the covariates matrix and β is the coefficients vector. The function F
here corresponds to the standard normal cumulative density function, correspond-
ing to a probit model. The shorthand notation 01 refers to the year 2001 and
likewise 06 to the year 2006. N06 and N01 denote the sample sizes of the two years.
Hats refer to estimated values. The hypothetical value F (X06βˆ01) estimates the
propensity of being covered by collective bargaining for individuals with charac-
teristics from 2006 if they lived in the labour market of 2001. We estimate all the
decompositions separately for males and females and for East and West Germany.
For all covariates we take differences to their 2001 means within the corresponding
subsample (males/ females; East/ West). This allows interpreting changes in the
constant as changes over time.
The second term in equation (1) is called the “characteristics effect”, as it repre-
sents differences in the outcome variable that are due to the differences in the
distributions of X (Fairlie, 2005, p. 307). The first term in brackets captures those
differences that are due to changes in the coefficients and in the constant. In case
there were relevant factors which are unobserved to the researcher, the constant
would be affected. In this case, also the coefficients could be biased in case the un-
observables correlate with the covariates. For this reason, the corresponding first
term of the decomposition is usually labelled “residual” term or “unexplained” part
(Fairlie, 2005, p.307; Schnabel, Wagner, 2007).
The coefficients βˆ are obtained from probit regressions of a collective bargaining
dummy on a set of covariates. The covariates can be grouped into three subgroups
of interest:
P: Personal characteristics of the employee, i.e. age, tenure and education.
F: Firm characteristics of the job match, i.e. firm size, region and share of male
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employees.
S: Sector of the firm, i.e. industry branch.7
Next, we extend the decomposition approach in order to consider the contributions
of these different sets of characteristics separately. This step requires a matching
of the observations for the construction of a hypothetical counterfactual combi-
nation.8 Fairlie (2005, p. 308) suggests matching the observations based on the
ranks of the fitted values of the estimated nonlinear functions. In case both sub-
groups are not of the same size, he further suggests using a random subsample
of the larger group. However, this approach does not explicitly take account of
the correlations between the covariates and therefore we now develop the approach
further (similar to Antonczyk et al., 2010). The following approach is based on the
sequential decomposition suggested in DiNardo et al. (1996) and developed further
in Chernozhukov et al. (2013) and in Antonczyk et al. (2009, 2010). While all
these approaches apply to the case of a continuous dependent variable, we will now
translate them to the case of a limited dependent variable based on Fairlie (2005).
Thus, we want to decompose:
(2)
Y¯ 06 − Y¯ 01 = F (β06P , β
06
F , β
06
S , β
06
0 , X
06
S , X
06
F , X
06
P )− F (β
01
P , β
06
F , β
01
S , β
01
0 , X
01
S , X
01
F , X
01
P )
where XP , XF and XS denote sets of personal and firm characteristics and the
industry sector respectively, and βP , βF and βS the corresponding coefficients. β0
denotes the constants obtained from the two underlying probit regressions for 2001
and 2006.
We will analyse the contribution of each of the components separately by changing
7The industry sector is of particular interest because collective bargaining is usually negotiated
on the industry level, recall section 2. The industry branch classification we use corresponds to
the NACE 1 classification on the two-digit level.
8Consider as an example changes in the sector composition of the workforce over time. In order
to estimate the contribution of only this change on collective bargaining coverage, everything else
has to be held constant. In this example, one might want to compare (X06
S
, X06
F
, X06
P
) with
this one: (X01
S
, X06
F
, X06
P
). This would require matching individuals from the year 2006 who
have (X06
F
, X06
P
) with some hypothetical industry sector from the year 2001 (X01
S
). This is the
explanation for why some sort of matching is required.
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them step by step as denoted by the following sequence of effects:
(3)
∆1 = F (β06
P
, β06F , β
06
S , β
06
0 , X
06
S , X
06
F , X
06
P )− F (β
01
P
, β06F , β
06
S , β
06
0 , X
06
S , X
06
F , X
06
P )
∆2 = F (β01P , β
06
F
, β06S , β
06
0 , X
06
S , X
06
F , X
06
P )− F (β
01
P , β
01
F
, β06S , β
06
0 , X
06
S , X
06
F , X
06
P )
∆3 = F (β01P , β
01
F , β
06
S
, β060 , X
06
S , X
06
F , X
06
P )− F (β
01
P , β
01
F , β
01
S
, β060 , X
06
S , X
06
F , X
06
P )
∆4 = F (β01P , β
01
F , β
01
S , β
06
0
, X06S , X
06
F , X
06
P )− F (β
01
P , β
01
F , β
01
S , β
01
0
, X06S , X
06
F , X
06
P )
∆5 = F (β01P , β
01
F , β
01
S , β
01
0 ,X
06
S
, X06F , X
06
P )− F (β
01
P , β
01
F , β
01
S , β
01
0 ,X
01
S
, X06F , X
06
P )
∆6 = F (β01P , β
01
F , β
01
S , β
01
0 , X
01
S ,X
06
F
, X06P )− F (β
01
P , β
01
F , β
01
S , β
01
0 , X
01
S ,X
01
F
, X06P )
∆7 = F (β01P , β
01
F , β
01
S , β
01
0 , X
01
S , X
01
F ,X
06
P
)− F (β01P , β
01
F , β
01
S , β
01
0 , X
01
S , X
01
F ,X
01
P
)
The choice of a sequence is not innocuous because the order matters in any sequen-
tial decomposition, i.e. they are path-dependent.9 We choose this specific sequence
of counterfactuals because it reflects the idea that we transfer the individuals from
2006 ‘back in time’ to the year 2001. We argue this is meaningful because this way
the first step reflects what the changing labour market remunerations (i.e. coef-
ficients) contributed to the drop in coverage, given the individual characteristics
of 2006. Only then, we change the characteristics. The complete sequential de-
composition of changes in collective bargaining coverage from 2001 to 2006 can be
summarised as:
Y¯ 2006 − Y¯ 2001 = ∆1︸︷︷︸
Personal
+ ∆2︸︷︷︸
Firm
+ ∆3︸︷︷︸
Sector︸ ︷︷ ︸
Coefficients
+ ∆4︸︷︷︸
Residual
+ ∆5︸︷︷︸
Sector
+ ∆6︸︷︷︸
Firm
+ ∆7︸︷︷︸
Personal︸ ︷︷ ︸
Characteristics
The first term of this detailed decomposition, ∆1, reflects changes in the propensity
to work under collective bargaining that are due to changes in the coefficients which
9An exception is an approach by Schwiebert (2015). This approach evaluates the difference in
a covariate xk at the corresponding marginal effect from a pooled regression. A drawback for the
applied work with large data sets is that this approach requires taking all possible pairs between
observations of each group. The approach also ignores correlations between characteristics which
our approach takes into account.
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correspond to personal characteristics. For example, for certain educational groups,
if the probability of working under collective contracts changed over time relative
to other educational groups, this would be reflected in this first component.
The second term of the detailed decomposition, ∆2, captures changes in the coeffi-
cients which correspond to firm characteristics. For example, for employees working
in small firms, if the probability of working under collective contracts changed over
time relative to large firms, this would be reflected in the second component.
The third term, ∆3, captures changes in the coefficients which correspond to the
industry sector. For example, for certain industries, if collective bargaining coverage
changed more strongly over time than for other industries, this would be reflected
in this third component.
The fourth term, ∆4, captures changes in the constant of the regression model over
time. This includes an average time shift that applies to all industries, all firms and
all employees. Further, a change in the constant includes changes in all variables
that are unobserved to the researcher. Therefore, the fourth component reflects all
residual factors.
The fifth component, ∆5, captures changes in the industry composition of the
workforce. For example, if there was a trend towards tertiarization and collective
bargaining coverage in the service sector differed from that in the manufacturing
sector, this compositional effect would be reflected in this fifth component.
The sixth component, ∆6, captures changes in the composition of firms. For ex-
ample, if there was a trend towards larger firms and if larger firms had different
propensities to be covered by collective bargaining than smaller firms, then this
would be reflected in this sixth component.
The seventh component, ∆7, captures changes in the composition of employees. For
example, if there was a trend towards educational upskilling and if highly educated
employees displayed lower probabilities of collective bargaining than lower educated
employees, then this would be reflected in this seventh component.
All seven components add up to the total change in collective bargaining coverage
over time as given by the difference between the average predicted values from the
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conditional models (see eq. 3).10
Up until step 4 it is sufficient for the implementation of the procedure to plug in
certain coefficients from 2001 together with the individual observations from 2006.
Then, for the fifth step it is necessary to simulate for the individuals from 2006 who
work in firms in 2006, in which industry sectors they would have worked in 2001.
This is implemented by kernel matching based on the normal Gaussian kernel.
Similarly, for the sixth step it is necessary to match the individual employees from
2006 to some firms and industry sectors in 2001. Again, this is implemented by
Gaussian kernel matching.
The crucial assumption that underlies the estimation of a hypothetical counterfac-
tual distribution is that a change in the covariates X does not affect the parameters
of the conditional distribution model given X (e.g. Chernozhukov et al., 2013; An-
tonczyk et al., 2010). Put differently, the decomposition approach ignores general
equilibrium effects. This is similar to other decomposition methods in the literature
(e.g. DiNardo et al., 1996).11 This means that if changes in the characteristics cause
the coefficients to change or vice versa, this interrelation could not be detected by
the decomposition approach.12
Another caveat to the standard Fairlie method refers to the fact that the residual
effect does not differentiate further between the impact of coefficients and of the
constant (Schnabel and Wagner, 2007). This point is addressed by our approach
because changes in the coefficients are separated from changes in the constant.
Finally, as explained above, sequential decompositions are path-dependent. There-
fore, the order will be reversed later to test for robustness (see the additional
appendix for details).
10Also see the discussion in Fortin et al. (2011, p. 52).
11For an overview see Fortin et al. (2011).
12Consider the example of a rise in the relative wages of high-skilled employees which causes
the supply of high-skilled to increase. An example of the opposite direction of the effect would be
the case of a rising supply of high-skilled which causes a reduction of their relative wages. These
types of indirect effects would be ignored by the decomposition approach employed here.
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4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis uses the 2001 and 2006 waves of the German Structure of Earnings
Survey (GSES, “Verdienststrukturerhebung”).13 This is a large mandatory linked
employer-employee data set (LEED) consisting of repeated cross-sections. There
exist comparable data sets in other EU countries, such as the Spanish Earnings
Structure Survey used e.g. by de la Rica et al. (2010). As data are reported by
the personnel departments of the establishments, such variables like coverage by
collective bargaining, industry sector, firm size, wage payments, and hours worked
are very reliable.14 The data involve a random draw among all establishments with
at least ten employees. The advantage of linked employer-employee data is the
joint availability of highly reliable firm-level and individual-specific data.15 The
disadvantage of this specific data set is that it consists of repeated cross-sections
rather than a panel. We still use it because of its way of measuring collective
bargaining coverage.
We limit our sample to establishments in the private sector which operate in those
industries that are available in both years.16 We limit our sample to prime aged
employees in Germany who work full time.17 The final sample includes for 2001
more than 400,000 employees in West Germany and about 125,000 employees in
East Germany (see Table 1). In 2006, there are more than 700,000 employees in
West Germany and 210,000 in East Germany. All observations are weighted by the
13Data access is provided by the research data centres of the Federal
Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the “La¨nder”. These also
provide metadata, see www.forschungsdatenzentrum.de/bestand/gls/index.asp
The quality report to this data set can be found at
www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Qualitaetsberichte/VerdiensteArbeitskosten/Gehaltlohn.pdf
Both sources last retrieved on 16. Feb. 2015. Also see the data documentation for this article.
14The number of observations increases substantially from 2001 to 2006. This is likely due to
the fact that thanks to the electronic data transfer, many firms in 2006 voluntarily provided data
on all of their employees rather than just reporting the data for a random selection of employees.
15For example, the ALLBUS data set does not contain industry sector since 1994 (Biebeler and
Lesch, 2007). The SOEP survey does not ask for coverage by collective bargaining. Even if it
did, respondents would not know whether their colleagues are paid by a collective contract and
there would be the risk of a large measurement error.
16This excludes the educational and the health sector.
17More precisely, we drop employees who are younger than 25 years of age or older than 55,
as well as employees currently in vocational training or who work in old-age part time, as in
Antonczyk et al., 2010.
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inverse sampling probability reported with the data. Table 2 provides definitions
of the variables available in our data.
In the data, it is reported for every individual employee whether she is covered by
sectoral level bargaining, firm level bargaining or individual bargaining. We com-
bine sectoral and firm level bargaining into just one category of collective bargaining
(see section 2). Next, we define an employee as covered by collective bargaining as
soon as she works in a covered establishment, i.e. an establishment with a mini-
mum number of individually-covered employees.18 This definition takes account of
the fact that generally collective bargaining coverage defines minimum standards
for all employees working in a covered establishment. Note that we still analyse
shares of covered individuals and not of covered firms (as done in Addison et al.,
2010, 2011; Schnabel et al., 2006). This allows filtering out effects of changes in
individual-specific characteristics, such as increases of the educational attainment.
Table 1 reports the shares of covered employees. The figures show the sharp drop in
coverage over the course of only five years. This holds for both, males and females.
While for males, coverage dropped from 70.3% (43.1%) in 2001 to 53.4% (35.5%)
in 2006 in West (East) Germany, for females the shares are 65.9% (49.8%) in 2001
and 45.9% (35.8%) in 2006. Thus, coverage dropped by 8-17 percentage points
(ppoints) for males and by 14-20 ppoints for females.
Compared to the literature on Germany, the coverage reported in the GSES is
lower. A different level of coverage can partly be explained by a different data
selection. We exclude not only the public sector but also the entire health and
education sector. Furthermore, the literature reports a smaller drop in coverage
over time. We think that the coverage variable in the GSES is more reliable than
self-reported coverage in non-mandatory surveys. Despite these differences, there
is a consensus in the literature that a sizeable decline in coverage by collective
bargaining occurred during the 2000s. We try to explain this drop by the following
decomposition approach.
Table A.1 and A.4 in the additional appendix display further descriptive statistics.
On average, females are younger, have less tenure, and work in smaller establish-
ments, compared to males. Tables 3 and 6 show the differences in coverage between
18We define an establishment as covered if at least one percent of employees are paid according
to a collective agreement.
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different groups. While in West Germany, the medium-skilled show the highest cov-
erage in 2001 and also for males in 2006, coverage in East Germany is highest for
the low-skilled in 2001 and also for low-skilled males in 2006. In contrast, coverage
in 2006 in both West and East Germany is highest for high-skilled females. Among
the federal states North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Bavaria, Saxony-Anhalt, and
Berlin start out with a high level of coverage in 2001 and experience a very sharp
drop in 2006 by 17 ppoints and more. As expected, coverage generally increases
with establishment size (with the exception that in 2006 the largest coverage rate
among females in West Germany is found for the second largest group of establish-
ments because the largest establishments show a very large drop). Regarding the
differences in coverage across industries, coverage is large for electricity, gas, water
(in West Germany), mining and quarrying, manufacturing of transport equipment,
post and telecommunications, finance and insurance, and coke, chemicals (in East
Germany). The industries with the lowest coverage are data processing (in West
Germany), real Estate (in East Germany), and research, other services. The gen-
eral descriptive findings are in line with the results reported by Ellguth and Kohaut
(2011) for 2010. There are some minor differences in the ranking of industries be-
tween West and East Germany. Furthermore, the drop in coverage is much more
uniform across industries in West Germany compared to East Germany. The sec-
tor of data processing in fact experienced an increase in coverage in both East and
West Germany. For East Germany, there are a number of further cases where cov-
erage increases over time (electricity, gas, water shows the strongest increase and
the level in 2006 in East Germany is higher than in West Germany). The largest
drop in both West and East Germany occurs in the post and telecommunications
sector (from more than 90% down to somewhere around 50%) which is most likely
related to the liberalisation and privatisation in these industries.
5 Results
First, we discuss the estimated probit regressions of coverage by collective bargain-
ing on the observed covariates of the employees. Second, we present and discuss the
detailed decomposition results which are based on the estimated probit regressions.
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5.1 Probit Results
We estimate flexible probit regressions by gender, year, and region. The detailed
coefficient estimates and average marginal effects are reported in the additional
appendix (Tables A.2, A.3, A.5, A.6). Most results are fairly similar for the different
genders, years, and regions. Our discussion will describe the qualitative nature of
the results and highlight some important differences.
While education plays only a small role in West Germany, coverage is U-shaped in
education for 2001 in East Germany, where the high-skilled actually show a higher
coverage than the medium-skilled. In 2006, coverage falls with higher education in
East Germany.19
The association of age with coverage is significantly negative or insignificant, and
the association of tenure with coverage is positive. This is consistent with coverage
being higher among older workers. Similarly, the literature reports higher levels of
union membership among older employees (Fitzenberger et al., 2011) and higher
levels of membership in employer associations among older firms (Schnabel and
Wagner, 1996).
The association of firm size with collective bargaining coverage is strongly posi-
tive and significant, both statistically and economically. The effect is similar to
membership in employer associations being larger among larger firms (Schnabel
and Wagner, 1996). In our analysis, there are strong differences between small and
large firms for all cases in 2001. For example, employees working in establishments
with 10 to 99 employees in West Germany are about 45 ppoints less likely to be
covered by collective bargaining in 2001 than employees working in establishments
with 2000 employees or more (the reference group). However, these differences are
reduced over time and we observe even some changes in the ranks, as in 2006 firms
with 1000 to 1999 employees show the highest coverage.
For West Germany in both years and for East Germany in 2006, the share of
male employees shows a strong positive association with coverage. However, this
19Incidentally, when the education variable is missing, coverage is lowest. This may be related
to the reliability of the reporting to the Federal Statistical Office and to the fact that coverage
is determined at the firm level in the following sense: We suspect that uncovered firms have less
’rules’ to follow and, therefore, have less ’sophisticated’ personnel records.
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does not hold for East Germany in 2001. The finding may indicate that collective
bargaining is more strongly male dominated in West Germany (see discussion in
Fitzenberger et al., 2011) and that there is a convergence of East Germany to West
German patterns.
There are some differences in coverage across German regions and the ranking
of regions changes over time. While North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) has a high
coverage level in 2001, coverage falls there below the level of all other West German
states in 2006. The same holds for Berlin in the East German sample. We cannot
explain these changes.
There are also noticeable differences across industries (note that the omitted cate-
gory refers to manufacturing of metals). The finance and insurance industry shows
very high coverage in all cases, in the order of 20 to 45 ppoints above the omitted
category. Also, manufacturing of coke and chemicals shows high coverage in all
cases. There are also some remarkable differences. For instance real estate shows
a very low coverage in all regions in 2001 but only for West Germany in 2006.
Turning to the changes over time, the ranking of industries changes little for West
Germany and much more so for East Germany. A noticeable change in both West
and East Germany involves the strong increase in coverage for data processing and
information systems. In East Germany, coverage in real estate increases strongly
over time.
Summing up, there are some noticeable changes in the coefficients over time re-
garding firm size and industries. These changes could drive to some extent the
observed decline in aggregate coverage, an issue which would show up in the coef-
ficients effects. Therefore, we now turn to the detailed decomposition analysis.
5.2 Sequential Decomposition Results
The benchmark decomposition results are reported in Tables 4 and 7. The upper
parts of the tables involve a simple decomposition into only two components, the
residual (coefficients) and the characteristics effect. The lower parts involve the
detailed decomposition into seven components, as described in section 3. The
overall decline in coverage, that is to be decomposed, amounts to -16.9 (-8.4) ppoints
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for males in West (East) Germany and to -19.9 (-13.9) ppoints for females in West
(East) Germany.20
The simple decomposition shows that for West Germany more than 90% of the
decline are explained by the residual effect. For East Germany, the residual effect
amounts to more than 100% for both, females and males. The residual effect in-
cludes changes in the coefficients and in the intercept. For West Germany, only 8%
(males) to 9% (females) are explained by changes in the composition of the work-
force (characteristics effect). For East Germany, the characteristics effect amounts
to -20% for females and -24% for males, meaning that in the East the changing
characteristics worked against a drop in collective bargaining coverage. For West
Germany these results are in line with the recent literature on union coverage
which documents a minor role of the characteristics effect (Addison et al., 2011;
Antonczyk et al., 2011; Fitzenberger et al., 2011; Schnabel and Wagner, 2007).
The sequential decomposition further decomposes the residual effect and the charac-
teristics effect, leaving the size of these total effects unchanged. The first three
components correspond to the coefficients for the personal characteristics (∆1),
firm characteristics (∆2), and for industry affiliation (∆3). For West Germany, all
of these contribute very little to the drop in coverage (the effects contribute at most
2.6% and for males the industry coefficients would even have implied an increase
in coverage). For East Germany, ∆1 and ∆2 also do not contribute in a sizeable
way to the drop in coverage while the industry coefficients effect ∆3 would have
implied a notable increase in coverage.
Turning to the three different characteristics effects, these also contribute in a minor
way to the drop in coverage for West Germany. Most importantly, changes in the
industry structure, ∆5, explain about 11% of the drop in coverage. Changes in
the firm characteristics, ∆6, contribute a smaller share of 5% for males and 2% for
females. Changes in personal characteristics, ∆7, counteract the decline in coverage
to a small extent. Again, for East Germany, the results are more complex and the
contribution of some of the sequential effects is quite large. Here, changes in the
industry structure, explain a major part of the drop in coverage (∆5: 23% for males
20The estimation of the sequential procedure is computationally involved and one run takes
about six days. This is why we cannot provide bootstrapped standard errors. The calculations
are carried out on a PC in Wiesbaden at the Federal Statistical Office.
19
and 6% for females) while changes in firm characteristics (∆6) would have implied
a sizeable increase in coverage (54% for males and 29% for females). Changes in
personal characteristics (∆7) contribute little. We argue that the compensating
firm and industry characteristics effects in East Germany still reflect the ongoing
structural adjustment process of the East German economy. On the one hand,
firm characteristics change in a way that would increase coverage. On the other
hand, industry changes counteract the firm characteristics effect in a way to reduce
coverage in East Germany. Both together may reflect strong structural changes in
the East German economy.
The component of the residual effect associated with the change in the intercept
(constant, ∆4) contributes most to the aggregate drop in coverage. This effect
reflects the unexplained time trend, i.e. the change in coverage that affects all
groups of workers and firms alike, including changes in unobserved covariates. The
residual component ∆4 amounts to -16 (14) ppoints or 95% (168%) for males in
West (East) Germany and to -17 (19) ppoints or 85% (136%) for females in West
(East) Germany. Thus, despite sizeable changes in slope coefficients and charac-
teristics, the overall drop in coverage remains unexplained reflecting changes in
the intercept. For instance, this means that the notable differences in the change
in coverage across industries (or other subgroups) discussed in section 4 do not
drive the aggregate drop in coverage. The drop in coverage has basically affected
all groups of employees, albeit to a varying degree. Put differently, the change in
coverage for the employee with average characteristics in 2001 (this is what ∆4 es-
timates) almost coincides with (even exceeds) the overall drop in coverage for West
Germany (East Germany), i.e. the noticeable differences in the change in coverage
(coefficients effect) and the noticeable changes in characteristics almost cancel each
other out. For instance, note that not all industries experience a decline in coverage
relative to the omitted category. In other words, different industry coefficients in
West Germany compensate each other, resulting in a industry coefficients effect
that is close to zero. This finding is in contrast to the notion that the drop in
coverage is associated with a decline of employment in high-coverage industries or
with certain large industries dropping out of collective bargaining.
These results are in line with the literature on coverage (mostly for West Ger-
many) which also documents the dominating role of the residual effect (Addison
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et al., 2011; Antonczyk et al., 2011).21 Recent decomposition analysis of the de-
cline of union membership have also found a minor role of the characteristics effect
(Fitzenberger et al., 2011; Schnabel and Wagner, 2007). In contrast, earlier studies
find a noticeable role of changes in characteristics (Fitzenberger et al., 1999; Beck
and Fitzenberger, 2004). Taking an intermediate position, Biebeler and Lesch
(2007) argue that workers’ preferences play an important role in explaining the
drop in union membership. There is more of a consensus for coverage implying
that changes in the composition of the workforce are not the main factor of the
drop in coverage. Our sequential approach adds to this literature by showing that
not the slope coefficients per se but changes in the constant or in unobservables
can fully rationalise the drop in coverage.
Which factors could be driving the strong unexplained reduction in coverage (∆4)
which is very similar for both males and females and even higher in East Germany
than in West Germany? Dustmann et al. (2014) argue that Germany was increasing
in the late 1990s and the early 2000s the flexibility of its labour market in order to
cope with the high unemployment rate and to improve its competitiveness. During
this time period wage inequality increased strongly (see also Antonczyk, 2011)
and a sizeable share of firms opted out of collective bargaining with the goal to
increase wage flexibility at the firm level. Furthermore, wage inequality increased
more strongly among covered firms during the early 2000s, thus wage setting under
collective bargaining became much more responsive to the conditions at the firm
level (Dustmann et al., 2014).
5.3 Robustness Check
In order to check for robustness of our results, we now reverse the direction of the
decomposition. The simple decomposition into only two effects now reads:
(4)
Y¯2006 − Y¯2001 =

N
06∑
i=1
F (X06βˆ06)
N06
−
N01∑
i=1
F (X01βˆ06)
N06


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Characteristics
+

N
01∑
i=1
F (X01βˆ06)
N06
−
N01∑
j=1
F (X01βˆ01)
N01


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Residual
21See Antonczyk et al., 2011 for a decomposition of coverage at the employee level and Addison
et al., 2011 for a decomposition of coverage at the establishment level.
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For the counterfactual used for the decomposition in the previous section, the
characteristics X from 2006 were evaluated at the coefficients from 2001, so far.
Now, for the counterfactual the characteristics X from 2001 are evaluated at the
coefficients from 2006, see equation (4). The detailed sequential decomposition
now starts from individuals in 2006 evaluated at coefficients from 2006, and then
first changes the personal characteristics (matching firm and industry from 2006),
next the firm characteristics (still matching the industry from 2006), and finally the
industry. Then, we transfer the hypothetical observations from 2001 ‘back in time’
by using the 2001 coefficients. The additional appendix [equation (A.1)] shows the
detailed sequential decomposition in reversed order.
The results of this reversed decomposition analysis are reported in Tables 5 and 8.
It is astonishing that the results of this simple decomposition remain nearly iden-
tical as compared to the original ordering for West Germany. For East Germany,
the residual component becomes even much stronger but some of the other sequen-
tial effects change. The residual effect (constant, ∆4rev) fully explains the drop in
coverage. In all cases, except for females in West Germany, this unexplained time
trend would have predicted an even higher drop in coverage than observed because
the contribution in these cases is above 100% [this is 107% (195%) for males in
West (East) Germany and 151% for females in East Germany]. The higher contri-
bution of the unexplained time trend here [see equation (A.1)] compared to section
5.2 [see equation (3)] implies that either changes in characteristics or changes in
coefficients from 2001 to 2006 have worked partly against the drop in coverage.
Furthermore, our findings for the coefficients effects typically show a small contri-
bution for West Germany but a noticeable contribution for East Germany in the
case of firm coefficients, ∆6rev. In East Germany, the firm coefficients contribute to
a rising tendency in coverage. As for the characteristics effects, all three are almost
negligible for West Germany. In contrast, for East Germany we find compensat-
ing effects between strong positive personal and industry characteristics (∆1rev and
∆3rev, personal characteristics and industries change in a way that would predict
an increase in coverage) and negative firm characteristics (∆2rev, firms change in
a way that would predict a drop in coverage). These strong and compensating
characteristics suggest that, evaluated at 2006 coefficients, the changes in charac-
teristics imply a stronger impact on coverage compared to section 5.2. Recall that
in all cases the characteristics effect as a whole does not provide an important
22
contribution to explain the drop in coverage. Thus, despite the differences in the
detailed decomposition results, the robustness analysis confirms the main finding
above, namely, that the unexplained time trend basically fully explains the drop in
coverage.
6 Conclusions
In Germany, as in most industrialised countries, union representation has been in
strong decline. This is reflected not only in the drop in union membership but
also in the drop in coverage by collective bargaining. This trend is important as
it is likely to translate into higher wage inequality (Card, 2001; Card et al., 2003;
Antonczyk et al., 2010; Dustmann et al., 2014; Addison et al., 2014).
This study investigates the drop in coverage for the case of Germany during the
early 2000s. We develop and implement a sequential decomposition approach that
extends upon Fairlie (2005) by using a well defined sequence of counterfactuals.
This allows gaining further insight on which of the covariates from the individual or
firm level dominate. Our study is the first one developing and applying a sequential
decomposition approach to the drop in collective bargaining coverage.
The empirical analysis uses linked employer-employee data from the German Struc-
ture of Earnings Survey (GSES, “Verdienststrukturerhebung”) comparing 2001 and
2006. The advantages of the GSES are the large sample size and the highly reliable
information provided based on personnel records of the establishments. Our data
show that the share of male employees working in covered firms dropped from 70%
(44%) in 2001 to about 53% (36%) in 2006 for West (East) Germany. Even more
so, among female employees coverage dropped from about 66% (50%) in 2001 to
46% (36%) in 2006 for West (East) Germany.
The decomposition results clearly show that only a minor part of the drop in col-
lective bargaining coverage can be explained by changes in the characteristics or
their corresponding slope coefficients. While the development of collective bar-
gaining over time varies substantially between different industries and groups of
firms, these differences do not fully explain the drop in coverage because relative
gains and losses cancel out. Instead, unexplained changes over time drive the re-
23
sult. This means that the drop in collective bargaining coverage is not confined
to certain industries, to establishments of a certain size, nor to certain educational
groups of employees. Nevertheless, we find strong evidence for different trends in
coverage across industries and groups of firms. These differences are particularly
strong in the case of East Germany where firm characteristics change in a way
that reduces coverage whereas changes in industries and personal characteristics
would have implied increasing coverage. Altogether these effects may reflect strong
ongoing structural changes in the East German economy. These findings would be
compatible with growing heterogeneity of industries and firms (Card et al., 2013).
There are a number of caveats regarding our analysis. First, it should be kept in
mind that we only observe whether firms explicitly state that they adhere to a
collective contract. This may include firms who are not legally required to do so
and this may exclude firms that are merely “oriented” towards a collective contract.
A natural next step for research would thus be to analyse whether selectivity into
collective bargaining coverage has changed over time (Gu¨rtzgen, 2015). Second, a
limitation of any decomposition method is that it does not allow causal conclusions
and that it ignores general equilibrium effects. Instead, the method points to which
are the more important factors associated (if any) with the drop in coverage by
collective bargaining – a contribution that we consider important. Third, the GSES
data we use involve less information at the individual level or at the establishment
level compared to some of the data sets used in the literature. Thus, our analysis
based on the GSES should be viewed as a complement rather than a substitute, on
the one hand, to the analysis of union membership based on the SOEP or ALLBUS
and, on the other hand, to a panel analysis of union coverage based on the IAB
establishment panel. Furthermore, the GSES data allow for a distinction between
firm-level and sectoral-level bargaining contracts which may be explored in future
work.
The findings presented here call for further research. What are the unobserved
drivers and mechanisms which lead to the drop in coverage? Because a drop in
coverage is observed in many countries (e.g. Visser, 2006) and because we find
a strong unexplained time trend, could there be a universal explanation, e.g. a
response to the globalisation of economic activity? As there exists only a small
and loosely related literature on this hypothesis (Neumayer and de Soysa, 2006),
we leave this question to future research.
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Appendix
Table 1: Shares of Employees Regarding Coverage by Collective Bargaining
West Germany
Males Females
Year 2001 2006 2001 2006
Covered 70.29 % 53.42 % 65.85 % 45.91 %
Not covered 29.71 % 46.58 % 34.15 % 54.09 %
No. of observations 311,054 517,969 101,992 184,247
East Germany
Males Females
Year 2001 2006 2001 2006
Covered 43.84 % 35.51 % 49.76 % 35.79 %
Not covered 56.16 % 64.49 % 50.24 % 64.21 %
No. of observations 84,186 140,374 41,762 72,658
Note: All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and
the Statistical Offices of the La¨nder: Gehalts- und Lohnstruktur-
erhebung 2001 and Verdienststrukturerhebung 2006, own calculations.
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Table 2: Definition of Variables
Label Description
Individual level
Low education Low level of education: no training beyond a school degree
Medium education Intermediate Level of education: vocational training
High education High level of education: university or university of applied sciences
Education n/a Missing information on the education level
Age Age in years
Tenure Tenure in years
Firm level
10 - 99 employees Firm has between 10 and 99 employees
100 - 199 employees Firm has between 100 and 199 employees
200 - 999 employees Firm has between 200 and 999 employees
1000 - 1999 employees Firm has between 1000 and 1999 employees
More than 2000 employees Firm has more than 2000 employees
Share of male employees Share of male employees, ranges between 0 and 1
West:
Schleswig-Holstein, HH Firm is located in Schleswig Holstein or Hamburg
Lower Saxony, Bremen Firm is located in Lower Saxony or Bremen
NRW Firm is located in North Rhine-Westphalia
Hesse Firm is located in Hesse
RLP, Saarland Firm is located in Rhineland-Palatinate or Saarland
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg Firm is located in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
Bavaria Firm is located in Bavaria
East:
Berlin Firm is located in Berlin
Brandenburg, Meck-Pom Firm is located in Brandenburg or Mecklenburg-West Pomerania
Saxony Firm is located in Saxony
Saxony-Anhalt Firm is located in Saxony-Anhalt
Thuringia Firm is located in Thuringia
Sector:
Mining, quarrying Mining and quarrying
Manufact: Food Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco
Manufact: Textiles Manufacture of textile and textile products, leather and leather products
Manufact: Wood Manufacture of wood and wood products
Publishing, printing Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
Manufact: Coke, chemicals Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; chemicals and chemical products
Manufact: Rubber, plastic Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
Manufact: Non-metallic Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
Manufact: Metals Manufacture of basic metals; fabricated metal products, except from machinery and equipment
Manufact: Machinery Manufacture of machinery and equipment
Manufact: Electr. machinery Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus
Manufact: Electr. equipment Manufacture of electrical & optical equipment; radio, TV, & communication equipment & apparatus
Manufact: Instruments Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
Manufact: Transport Manufacture of transport equipment
Manufact: n.e.c. Manufacture not elsewhere classified
Electricity, gas, water Electricity, gas and water supply
Construction Construction
Auto sales, repair Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel
Wholesale trade Wholesale trade and commission trade except for motor vehicles and motorcycles
Retail trade Retail trade, except from motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods
Hotels, restaurants Hotels and restaurants
Transport Land, water and air transport
Auxiliary transport Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies
Post, telecommunications Post and telecommunications
Finance, insurance Financial intermediation, insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
Real estate Real estate activities; renting of machinery and equipment without operator
Data processing Data processing and information systems
Research, other services Research and development and other services
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Collective bargaining coverage in subgroups, West
Label Males Females
2001 2006 2006-2001 2001 2006 2006-2001
Share Share ∆ Share Share Share ∆ Share
Individual level
Low education 0.715 0.550 -0.165 0.705 0.524 -0.181
Medium education (Reference) 0.726 0.571 -0.155 0.676 0.485 -0.192
High education 0.707 0.568 -0.139 0.636 0.485 -0.151
Education n/a 0.441 0.244 -0.197 0.433 0.235 -0.198
Firm level
10 - 99 employees 0.456 0.292 -0.246 0.428 0.248 -0.180
100 - 199 employees 0.668 0.467 -0.201 0.604 0.431 -0.173
200 - 999 employees 0.808 0.614 -0.194 0.759 0.551 -0.208
1000 - 1999 employees 0.900 0.788 -0.112 0.884 0.735 -0.149
More than 2000 employees (Reference) 0.964 0.810 -0.154 0.943 0.670 -0.273
Schleswig-Holstein, HH 0.582 0.478 -0.104 0.571 0.433 -0.138
Lower Saxony, Bremen 0.748 0.611 -0.137 0.708 0.502 -0.206
NRW (Reference) 0.735 0.528 -0.207 0.704 0.448 -0.256
Hessen 0.656 0.506 -0.150 0.602 0.442 -0.160
RLP, Saarland 0.718 0.590 -0.128 0.688 0.534 -0.154
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 0.661 0.498 -0.163 0.611 0.460 -0.151
Bavaria 0.718 0.546 -0.172 0.668 0.449 -0.219
Mining, quarrying 0.947 0.775 -0.172 0.925 0.627 -0.298
Manufact: Food 0.671 0.390 -0.281 0.560 0.331 -0.229
Manufact: Textiles 0.784 0.494 -0.290 0.712 0.390 -0.322
Manufact: Wood 0.699 0.495 -0.204 0.666 0.490 -0.176
Publishing, printing 0.717 0.509 -0.208 0.632 0.503 -0.129
Manufact: Coke, chemicals 0.896 0.835 -0.061 0.773 0.732 -0.041
Manufact: Rubber, plastic 0.664 0.432 -0.232 0.578 0.412 -0.166
Manufact: Non-metallic 0.834 0.502 -0.332 0.776 0.477 -0.299
Manufact: Metals (Reference) 0.695 0.501 -0.194 0.648 0.525 -0.123
Manufact: Machinery 0.738 0.652 -0.086 0.755 0.599 -0.156
Manufact: Electr. machinery 0.789 0.603 -0.186 0.720 0.550 -0.170
Manufact: Electr. equipment 0.793 0.463 -0.330 0.730 0.383 -0.347
Manufact: Instruments 0.620 0.505 -0.115 0.550 0.452 -0.098
Manufact: Transport 0.938 0.820 -0.118 0.922 0.751 -0.171
Manufact: n.e.c. 0.687 0.441 -0.246 0.594 0.371 -0.223
Electricity, gas, water 0.960 0.886 -0.074 0.919 0.881 -0.038
Construction 0.696 0.511 -0.185 0.663 0.505 -0.158
Auto sales, repair 0.689 0.445 -0.244 0.655 0.406 -0.249
Wholesale trade 0.500 0.311 -0.189 0.496 0.279 -0.217
Retail trade 0.644 0.382 -0.262 0.754 0.379 -0.375
Hotels, restaurants 0.587 0.458 -0.129 0.569 0.468 -0.101
Transport 0.551 0.377 -0.174 0.600 0.473 -0.127
Auxiliary transport 0.610 0.301 -0.309 0.662 0.366 -0.294
Post, telecommunications 0.952 0.497 -0.455 0.906 0.429 -0.477
Finance, insurance 0.907 0.802 -0.105 0.918 0.804 -0.114
Real estate 0.579 0.263 -0.316 0.502 0.241 -0.261
Data processing 0.300 0.424 0.124 0.277 0.349 0.072
Research, other services 0.339 0.430 0.091 0.343 0.322 -0.021
Overall 0.703 0.534 -0.169 0.659 0.459 -0.199
No. of observations 311,054 517,969 101,992 184,247
Note: All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the La¨nder:
Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung 2001 and Verdienststrukturerhebung 2006, own calculations.32
Table 4: Decomposition results, West
Males Females
Component Value Percent Value Percent
Difference in coverage 2001-2006 -0.169 100 % -0.199 100 %
Residual effect (incl. coeff. effect) -0.148 87.8 % -0.178 89.3 %
Characteristics effect -0.021 12.2 % -0.021 10.7 %
∆1 Personal coefficients -0.002 1.0 % -0.002 1.2 %
∆2 Firm coefficients -0.001 0.5 % -0.005 2.6 %
∆3 Industry coefficients 0.014 -8.2 % -0.002 1.0 %
∆4 Constant / Residual effect -0.160 94.5 % -0.168 84.5 %
∆5 Industry (characteristics) -0.019 11.0 % -0.022 11.1 %
∆6 Firm characteristics -0.009 5.2 % -0.005 2.3 %
∆7 Personal characteristics 0.007 -4.0 % 0.005 -2.7 %
No. of observations 829,023 286,239
Results show the sequential decomposition of the change in collective
bargaining coverage from 2001 to 2006 as explained in section 3.
Note: All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical
Offices of the La¨nder: GLS 2001 and VSE 2006, own calculations.
Table 5: Sensitivity check: Decomposition in reversed order, West
Males Females
Component Value Percent Value Percent
Difference in coverage 2001-2006 -0.169 100 % -0.199 100 %
Residual effect (incl. coeff. effect) -0.162 95.6 % -0.182 91.8 %
Characteristics effect -0.007 4.4 % -0.016 8.2 %
∆1rev Personal characteristics -0.009 5.1 % 0.003 -1.3 %
∆2rev Firm characteristics 0.001 -0.6 % -0.003 1.8 %
∆3rev Industry (characteristics) 0.000 -0.2 % -0.015 7.7 %
∆4rev Constant / Residual effect -0.192 107.6 % -0.189 95.2 %
∆5rev Industry coefficients 0.005 -2.8 % -0.006 2.9 %
∆6rev Firm coefficients 0.013 -7.8 % 0.012 -5.9 %
∆7rev Personal coefficients 0.003 -1.4 % 0.001 -0.4 %
No. of observations 829,023 286,239
Results show the sequential decomposition of the change in collective
bargaining coverage from 2001 to 2006 as explained in section 5.3.
Note: All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical
Offices of the La¨nder: GLS 2001 and VSE 2006, own calculations.
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics: Collective bargaining coverage in subgroups, East
Label Males Females
2001 2006 2006-2001 2001 2006 2006-2001
Share Share ∆ Share Share Share ∆ Share
Individual level
Low education 0.601 0.425 -0.177 0.583 0.389 -0.194
Medium education (Reference) 0.434 0.364 -0.070 0.502 0.367 -0.135
High education 0.520 0.397 -0.123 0.556 0.423 -0.133
Education n/a 0.314 0.244 -0.070 0.385 0.256 -0.129
Firm level
10 - 99 employees 0.242 0.188 -0.053 0.269 0.163 -0.106
100 - 199 employees 0.489 0.331 -0.149 0.524 0.330 -0.194
200 - 999 employees 0.703 0.520 -0.184 0.721 0.502 -0.219
1000 - 1999 employees 0.872 0.720 -0.152 0.879 0.675 -0.204
More than 2000 employees (Reference) 0.905 0.692 -0.214 0.895 0.652 -0.243
Berlin 0.600 0.378 -0.222 0.644 0.370 -0.274
Brandenburg, Meck-Pom (Reference) 0.393 0.341 -0.052 0.493 0.358 -0.135
Saxony 0.416 0.384 -0.032 0.438 0.385 -0.053
Saxony-Anhalt 0.408 0.322 -0.086 0.521 0.352 -0.170
Thuringia 0.383 0.323 -0.059 0.396 0.295 -0.101
Mining, quarrying 0.840 0.745 -0.095 0.843 0.899 0.056
Manufact: Food 0.499 0.332 -0.168 0.404 0.239 -0.165
Manufact: Textiles 0.468 0.242 -0.226 0.338 0.109 -0.229
Manufact: Wood 0.358 0.324 -0.034 0.347 0.323 -0.023
Publishing, printing 0.584 0.330 -0.254 0.566 0.304 -0.262
Manufact: Coke, chemicals 0.838 0.638 -0.200 0.769 0.602 -0.167
Manufact: Rubber, plastic 0.382 0.209 -0.173 0.292 0.181 -0.112
Manufact: Non-metallic 0.415 0.415 -0.000 0.618 0.365 -0.253
Manufact: Metals (Reference) 0.342 0.239 -0.103 0.308 0.223 -0.086
Manufact: Machinery 0.454 0.225 -0.229 0.438 0.247 -0.191
Manufact: Electr. machinery 0.623 0.465 -0.157 0.508 0.410 -0.098
Manufact: Electr. equipment 0.574 0.169 -0.405 0.521 0.180 -0.340
Manufact: Instruments 0.411 0.253 -0.158 0.257 0.184 -0.073
Manufact: Transport 0.800 0.653 -0.147 0.736 0.589 -0.147
Manufact: n.e.c. 0.351 0.117 -0.235 0.333 0.080 -0.253
Electricity, gas, water 0.736 0.907 0.171 0.729 0.921 0.192
Construction 0.321 0.306 -0.015 0.334 0.337 0.003
Auto sales, repair 0.301 0.083 -0.218 0.241 0.062 -0.179
Wholesale trade 0.444 0.274 -0.170 0.512 0.250 -0.262
Retail trade 0.503 0.354 -0.149 0.592 0.339 -0.253
Hotels, restaurants 0.445 0.284 -0.161 0.454 0.341 -0.112
Transport 0.422 0.371 -0.052 0.562 0.564 -0.001
Auxiliary transport 0.376 0.169 -0.206 0.552 0.274 -0.278
Post, telecommunications 0.946 0.574 -0.372 0.948 0.528 -0.420
Finance, insurance 0.903 0.736 -0.168 0.945 0.783 -0.162
Real estate 0.240 0.394 0.155 0.245 0.248 0.003
Data processing 0.450 0.403 0.047 0.432 0.399 -0.032
Research, other services 0.266 0.429 0.163 0.370 0.308 -0.062
Overall 0.438 0.355 -0.083 0.500 0.358 -0.140
No. of observations 84,186 140,374 41,762 72,658
All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the La¨nder:
Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung 2001 and Verdienststrukturerhebung 2006, own calculations.
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Table 7: Decomposition results, East
Males Females
Component Value Percent Value Percent
Difference in coverage 2001-2006 -0.084 100 % -0.139 100 %
Residual effect (incl. coeff. effect) -0.104 123.8 % -0.167 119.9 %
Characteristics effect 0.020 -23.8 % 0.028 -19.9 %
∆1 Personal coefficients 0.001 -1.0 % 0.001 -0.5 %
∆2 Firm coefficients 0.008 -9.4 % -0.001 0.8 %
∆3 Industry coefficients 0.029 -34.0 % 0.023 -16.2 %
∆4 Constant / Residual effect -0.142 168.2 % -0.189 135.8 %
∆5 Industry (characteristics) -0.020 23.3 % -0.008 6.1 %
∆6 Firm characteristics 0.046 -54.3 % 0.041 -29.3 %
∆7 Personal characteristics -0.006 7.2 % -0.005 3.2 %
No. of observations 224,560 114,420
Results show the sequential decomposition of the change in collective
bargaining coverage from 2001 to 2006 as explained in section 3.
All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical
Offices of the La¨nder: GLS 2001 and VSE 2006, own calculations.
Table 8: Sensitivity check: Decomposition in reversed order, East
Males Females
Component Value Percent Value Percent
Difference in coverage 2001-2006 -0.084 100 % -0.139 100 %
Residual effect (incl. coeff. effect) -0.112 132.7 % -0.178 127.9 %
Characteristics effect 0.028 -32.7 % 0.039 -27.9 %
∆1rev Personal characteristics 0.039 -46.3 % 0.036 -26.0 %
∆2rev Firm characteristics -0.028 33.4 % -0.027 19.4 %
∆3rev Industry (characteristics) 0.017 -19.8 % 0.029 -21.2 %
∆4rev Constant / Residual effect -0.164 194.5 % -0.210 151.4 %
∆5rev Industry coefficients 0.013 -15.8 % 0.010 -7.4 %
∆6rev Firm coefficients 0.038 -45.6 % 0.023 -16.3 %
∆7rev Personal coefficients 0.000 -0.3 % -0.000 0.2 %
No. of observations 224,560 114,420
Results show the sequential decomposition of the change in collective
bargaining coverage from 2001 to 2006 as explained in section 5.3.
Note: All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical
Offices of the La¨nder: GLS 2001 and VSE 2006, own calculations.
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Description of sequential decomposition in reversed order for robustness
analysis in section 5.3:
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics, West
Label Males Females
2001 2006 2001 2006
Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd.
Individual level
Low education 0.144 (0.351) 0.122 (0.327) 0.188 (0.391) 0.152 (0.359)
Medium education (Reference) 0.677 (0.468) 0.650 (0.477) 0.664 (0.473) 0.636 (0.481)
High education 0.111 (0.315) 0.124 (0.330) 0.065 (0.246) 0.085 (0.278)
Education n/a 0.068 (0.252) 0.104 (0.306) 0.083 (0.276) 0.128 (0.334)
Age 39.61 (7.99) 40.59 (7.99) 38.95 (8.47) 39.58 (8.66)
Tenure 10.05 (9.15) 10.59 (9.16) 8.55 (8.35) 8.91 (8.22)
Firm level
10 - 99 employees 0.348 (0.476) 0.339 (0.473) 0.352 (0.478) 0.347 (0.476)
100 - 199 employees 0.130 (0.336) 0.135 (0.341) 0.140 (0.347) 0.145 (0.352)
200 - 999 employees 0.265 (0.441) 0.266 (0.442) 0.281 (0.449) 0.296 (0.456)
1000 - 1999 employees 0.069 (0.254) 0.079 (0.270) 0.073 (0.260) 0.081 (0.272)
More than 2000 employees (Reference) 0.188 (0.391) 0.181 (0.385) 0.155 (0.362) 0.132 (0.339)
Share of male employees 0.759 (0.185) 0.756 (0.185) 0.525 (0.234) 0.518 (0.235)
Schleswig-Holstein, HH 0.055 (0.228) 0.058 (0.234) 0.069 (0.253) 0.071 (0.257)
Lower Saxony, Bremen 0.115 (0.319) 0.114 (0.317) 0.098 (0.297) 0.105 (0.306)
NRW (Reference) 0.295 (0.456) 0.276 (0.447) 0.279 (0.449) 0.263 (0.440)
Hesse 0.091 (0.288) 0.098 (0.297) 0.105 (0.306) 0.117 (0.322)
RLP, Saarland 0.069 (0.253) 0.064 (0.245) 0.062 (0.241) 0.056 (0.229)
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 0.188 (0.390) 0.189 (0.391) 0.195 (0.397) 0.186 (0.389)
Bavaria 0.187 (0.390) 0.201 (0.401) 0.192 (0.394) 0.202 (0.401)
Mining, quarrying 0.012 (0.109) 0.009 (0.095) 0.002 (0.045) 0.001 (0.036)
Manufact: Food 0.033 (0.178) 0.029 (0.169) 0.059 (0.236) 0.056 (0.231)
Manufact: Textiles 0.009 (0.095) 0.007 (0.084) 0.027 (0.162) 0.019 (0.137)
Manufact: Wood 0.024 (0.152) 0.019 (0.135) 0.013 (0.112) 0.011 (0.106)
Publishing, printing 0.021 (0.142) 0.016 (0.124) 0.032 (0.177) 0.024 (0.153)
Manufact: Coke, chemicals 0.042 (0.200) 0.034 (0.181) 0.038 (0.191) 0.034 (0.181)
Manufact: Rubber, plastic 0.032 (0.177) 0.028 (0.164) 0.027 (0.163) 0.023 (0.148)
Manufact: Non-metallic 0.021 (0.144) 0.016 (0.124) 0.010 (0.099) 0.010 (0.098)
Manufact: Metals (Reference) 0.087 (0.282) 0.076 (0.264) 0.042 (0.200) 0.034 (0.182)
Manufact: Machinery 0.096 (0.294) 0.103 (0.304) 0.047 (0.212) 0.050 (0.217)
Manufact: Electr. machinery 0.033 (0.178) 0.031 (0.174) 0.036 (0.186) 0.030 (0.171)
Manufact: Electr. equipment 0.019 (0.136) 0.013 (0.111) 0.022 (0.146) 0.014 (0.118)
Manufact: Instruments 0.019 (0.137) 0.019 (0.137) 0.025 (0.157) 0.023 (0.149)
Manufact: Transport 0.086 (0.280) 0.104 (0.305) 0.031 (0.173) 0.033 (0.179)
Manufact: n.e.c. 0.019 (0.138) 0.015 (0.122) 0.016 (0.126) 0.013 (0.113)
Electricity, gas, water 0.013 (0.114) 0.016 (0.124) 0.007 (0.081) 0.007 (0.085)
Construction 0.090 (0.287) 0.068 (0.251) 0.019 (0.140) 0.013 (0.114)
Auto sales, repair 0.030 (0.170) 0.032 (0.176) 0.015 (0.123) 0.017 (0.129)
Wholesale trade 0.077 (0.267) 0.079 (0.269) 0.085 (0.279) 0.093 (0.290)
Retail trade 0.039 (0.194) 0.036 (0.187) 0.119 (0.324) 0.123 (0.329)
Hotels, restaurants 0.011 (0.103) 0.011 (0.106) 0.031 (0.173) 0.033 (0.180)
Transport 0.016 (0.127) 0.027 (0.161) 0.008 (0.090) 0.013 (0.113)
Auxiliary transport 0.025 (0.155) 0.033 (0.178) 0.025 (0.157) 0.032 (0.177)
Post, telecommunications 0.009 (0.093) 0.008 (0.089) 0.009 (0.094) 0.008 (0.090)
Finance, insurance 0.053 (0.225) 0.043 (0.203) 0.121 (0.326) 0.097 (0.296)
Real estate 0.007 (0.083) 0.029 (0.169) 0.012 (0.108) 0.027 (0.162)
Data processing 0.018 (0.132) 0.005 (0.074) 0.017 (0.128) 0.010 (0.101)
Research, other services 0.059 (0.236) 0.095 (0.294) 0.103 (0.304) 0.151 (0.358)
No. of observations 311,054 517,969 101,992 184,247
Note: All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the La¨nder:
Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung 2001 and Verdienststrukturerhebung 2006, own calculations.
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Table A.2: Probit results males, 2001 and 2006, West
2001 2006
Variable Coeff. (s.e.) Marg. Eff. (s.e.) Coeff. (s.e.) Marg. Eff. (s.e.)
Individual level
Low education -0.029 (0.010) -0.007 (0.002) 0.025 (0.008) 0.008 (0.003)
High education 0.007 (0.011) 0.002 (0.003) -0.041 (0.008) -0.013 (0.003)
Education n/a -0.337 (0.013) -0.084 (0.003) -0.520 (0.010) -0.162 (0.003)
Age -0.002 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.003 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000)
Tenure 0.027 (0.001) 0.007 (0.000) 0.021 (0.000) 0.006 (0.000)
Firm level
10 - 99 employees -1.810 (0.014) -0.447 (0.003) -1.112 (0.010) -0.347 (0.003)
100 - 199 employees -1.191 (0.015) -0.295 (0.004) -0.627 (0.010) -0.196 (0.003)
200 - 999 employees -0.708 (0.014) -0.175 (0.003) -0.326 (0.010) -0.102 (0.003)
1000 - 1999 employees -0.309 (0.018) -0.076 (0.004) 0.125 (0.012) 0.039 (0.004)
Share of male employees 0.562 (0.023) 0.139 (0.006) 0.707 (0.020) 0.221 (0.006)
Schleswig-Holstein, HH -0.407 (0.014) -0.101 (0.003) 0.010 (0.011) 0.031 (0.003)
Lower Saxony, Bremen 0.081 (0.012) 0.020 (0.003) 0.258 (0.010) 0.081 (0.003)
Hesse -0.316 (0.013) -0.078 (0.003) -0.111 (0.010) -0.035 (0.003)
RLP, Saarland -0.171 (0.013) -0.042 (0.003) 0.196 (0.011) 0.061 (0.004)
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg -0.299 (0.011) -0.074 (0.003) -0.087 (0.009) -0.027 (0.003)
Bavaria -0.162 (0.011) -0.040 (0.003) 0.069 (0.009) 0.022 (0.003)
Mining, quarrying 0.797 (0.030) 0.197 (0.008) 0.233 (0.035) 0.073 (0.011)
Manufact: Food 0.053 (0.022) 0.013 (0.005) -0.120 (0.016) -0.038 (0.005)
Manufact: Textiles 0.406 (0.035) 0.101 (0.009) 0.241 (0.024) 0.075 (0.007)
Manufact: Wood 0.036 (0.018) 0.009 (0.004) 0.061 (0.019) 0.019 (0.006)
Publishing, printing 0.359 (0.021) 0.089 (0.005) 0.323 (0.017) 0.101 (0.005)
Manufact: Coke, chemicals 0.446 (0.022) 0.110 (0.005) 0.836 (0.017) 0.261 (0.005)
Manufact: Rubber, plastic -0.109 (0.018) -0.027 (0.005) -0.162 (0.019) -0.051 (0.006)
Manufact: Non-metallic 0.623 (0.020) 0.154 (0.005) 0.095 (0.020) 0.030 (0.006)
Manufact: Machinery -0.000 (0.016) -0.000 (0.004) 0.304 (0.015) 0.095 (0.005)
Manufact: Electr. machinery 0.053 (0.021) 0.013 (0.005) 0.171 (0.017) 0.053 (0.005)
Manufact: Electr. equipment -0.038 (0.021) -0.009 (0.005) -0.205 (0.019) -0.064 (0.006)
Manufact: Instruments -0.219 (0.022) -0.054 (0.006) 0.083 (0.017) 0.026 (0.005)
Manufact: Transport 0.302 (0.019) 0.075 (0.005) 0.421 (0.015) 0.131 (0.005)
Manufact: n.e.c. 0.029 (0.023) 0.007 (0.006) -0.034 (0.021) -0.010 (0.006)
Electricity, gas, water 0.740 (0.038) 0.183 (0.009) 0.935 (0.025) 0.292 (0.008)
Construction 0.515 (0.016) 0.128 (0.004) 0.447 (0.016) 0.140 (0.005)
Auto sales, repair 0.352 (0.022) 0.087 (0.005) 0.177 (0.021) 0.055 (0.007)
Wholesale trade -0.182 (0.017) -0.045 (0.004) -0.128 (0.017) -0.040 (0.005)
Retail trade 0.286 (0.023) 0.071 (0.006) 0.085 (0.024) 0.027 (0.007)
Hotels, restaurants 0.454 (0.034) 0.113 (0.009) 0.625 (0.030) 0.195 (0.009)
Transport -0.183 (0.024) -0.045 (0.006) -0.026 (0.016) -0.008 (0.005)
Auxiliary transport -0.002 (0.019) -0.001 (0.005) -0.249 (0.017) -0.078 (0.005)
Post, telecommunications 1.170 (0.093) 0.290 (0.023) -0.049 (0.018) -0.015 (0.006)
Finance, insurance 0.863 (0.047) 0.214 (0.011) 0.937 (0.019) 0.293 (0.006)
Real estate -0.974 (0.021) -0.241 (0.005) -0.442 (0.016) -0.138 (0.005)
Data processing 0.341 (0.041) 0.084 (0.010) 0.352 (0.030) 0.110 (0.009)
Research, other services -0.758 (0.018) -0.188 (0.004) 0.169 (0.015) 0.053 (0.005)
Constant 0.731 (0.004) 0.143 (0.003)
No. of observations 311,054 517,969
The table displays average marginal effects. The regression model does not contain any interaction terms.
The standard errors for the marginal effects are obtained from the delta method.
Note: All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the La¨nder:
Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung 2001 and Verdienststrukturerhebung 2006, own calculations.3
Table A.3: Probit results females, 2001 and 2006, West
2001 2006
Variable Coeff. (s.e.) Marg. Eff. (s.e.) Coeff. (s.e.) Marg. Eff. (s.e.)
Individual level
Low education 0.036 (0.016) 0.010 (0.004) 0.089 (0.014) 0.028 (0.005)
High education -0.096 (0.022) -0.026 (0.006) -0.019 (0.017) -0.006 (0.005)
Education n/a -0.291 (0.022) -0.078 (0.006) -0.374 (0.016) -0.120 (0.005)
Age -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) -0.004 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)
Tenure 0.026 (0.001) 0.007 (0.000) 0.022 (0.001) 0.007 (0.000)
Firm level
10 - 99 employees -1.639 (0.025) -0.441 (0.007) -0.901 (0.021) -0.289 (0.006)
100 - 199 employees -1.128 (0.026) -0.304 (0.007) -0.430 (0.020) -0.138 (0.006)
200 - 999 employees -0.678 (0.024) -0.182 (0.006) -0.211 (0.019) -0.068 (0.006)
1000 - 1999 employees -0.172 (0.032) -0.046 (0.008) 0.201 (0.022) 0.064 (0.007)
Share of male employees 0.378 (0.033) 0.102 (0.009) 0.758 (0.027) 0.243 (0.009)
Schleswig-Holstein, HH -0.319 (0.025) -0.086 (0.007) 0.131 (0.018) 0.042 (0.006)
Lower Saxony, Bremen 0.127 (0.022) 0.034 (0.006) 0.190 (0.018) 0.061 (0.006)
Hesse -0.396 (0.024) -0.107 (0.006) -0.104 (0.020) -0.033 (0.006)
RLP, Saarland -0.015 (0.024) -0.004 (0.006) 0.341 (0.020) 0.109 (0.006)
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg -0.301 (0.019) -0.081 (0.005) 0.020 (0.015) 0.006 (0.005)
Bavaria -0.137 (0.020) -0.037 (0.005) 0.059 (0.015) 0.019 (0.005)
Mining, quarrying 0.851 (0.095) 0.229 (0.026) 0.027 (0.093) 0.009 (0.030)
Manufact: Food -0.055 (0.037) -0.015 (0.010) -0.210 (0.035) -0.067 (0.011)
Manufact: Textiles 0.360 (0.040) 0.097 (0.011) -0.048 (0.037) -0.015 (0.012)
Manufact: Wood 0.076 (0.040) 0.021 (0.011) -0.079 (0.048) -0.025 (0.015)
Publishing, printing 0.235 (0.036) 0.063 (0.010) 0.299 (0.035) 0.096 (0.011)
Manufact: Coke, chemicals 0.113 (0.039) 0.030 (0.010) 0.523 (0.036) 0.168 (0.012)
Manufact: Rubber, plastic -0.193 (0.038) -0.052 (0.010) -0.274 (0.042) -0.088 (0.013)
Manufact: Non-metallic 0.387 (0.046) 0.104 (0.012) -0.145 (0.048) -0.046 (0.016)
Manufact: Machinery 0.062 (0.040) 0.017 (0.011) 0.002 (0.039) 0.001 (0.012)
Manufact: Electr. machinery -0.044 (0.040) -0.012 (0.011) -0.028 (0.038) -0.009 (0.012)
Manufact: Electr. equipment -0.145 (0.038) -0.039 (0.010) -0.460 (0.039) -0.147 (0.013)
Manufact: Instruments -0.231 (0.039) -0.062 (0.011) -0.130 (0.036) -0.042 (0.012)
Manufact: Transport 0.461 (0.050) 0.124 (0.013) 0.217 (0.041) 0.070 (0.013)
Manufact: n.e.c. -0.126 (0.043) -0.034 (0.012) -0.321 (0.046) -0.103 (0.015)
Electricity, gas, water 0.399 (0.082) 0.107 (0.022) 0.979 (0.059) 0.314 (0.019)
Construction 0.339 (0.046) 0.091 (0.012) 0.241 (0.052) 0.077 (0.017)
Auto sales, repair 0.336 (0.050) 0.090 (0.014) -0.051 (0.051) -0.016 (0.016)
Wholesale trade -0.175 (0.034) -0.047 (0.009) -0.389 (0.036) -0.125 (0.012)
Retail trade 0.626 (0.037) 0.168 (0.010) 0.044 (0.038) 0.014 (0.012)
Hotels, restaurants 0.437 (0.043) 0.118 (0.011) 0.561 (0.042) 0.180 (0.013)
Transport -0.104 (0.052) -0.028 (0.014) 0.010 (0.038) 0.003 (0.012)
Auxiliary transport 0.064 (0.037) 0.017 (0.011) -0.223 (0.037) -0.072 (0.012)
Post, telecommunications 0.922 (0.171) 0.248 (0.046) -0.274 (0.039) -0.088 (0.012)
Finance, insurance 0.975 (0.058) 0.262 (0.015) 0.824 (0.035) 0.264 (0.011)
Real estate -0.832 (0.039) -0.224 (0.010) -0.616 (0.037) -0.197 (0.012)
Data processing 0.028 (0.054) 0.007 (0.015) 0.043 (0.046) 0.014 (0.015)
Research, other services -0.580 (0.033) -0.156 (0.009) -0.130 (0.034) -0.042 (0.011)
Constant 0.536 (0.007) -0.052 (0.005)
No. of observations 101,992 184,247
The table displays average marginal effects. The regression model does not contain any interaction terms.
The standard errors for the marginal effects are obtained from the delta method.
Note: All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the La¨nder:
Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung 2001 and Verdienststrukturerhebung 2006, own calculations.
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics, East
Label Males Females
2001 2006 2001 2006
Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd. Mean Stdd.
Individual level
Low education 0.050 (0.217) 0.046 (0.211) 0.065 (0.247) 0.054 (0.226)
Medium education (Reference) 0.733 (0.443) 0.717 (0.450) 0.721 (0.449) 0.695 (0.460)
High education 0.107 (0.309) 0.107 (0.309) 0.090 (0.286) 0.104 (0.305)
Education n/a 0.110 (0.313) 0.130 (0.336) 0.124 (0.330) 0.147 (0.354)
Age 40.041 (7.923) 41.068 (8.337) 40.569 (7.888) 41.657 (8.246)
Tenure 7.464 (8.166) 8.121 (8.346) 7.539 (7.556) 8.750 (8.015)
Firm level
10 - 99 employees 0.554 (0.497) 0.485 (0.500) 0.480 (0.500) 0.428 (0.495)
100 - 199 employees 0.141 (0.348) 0.161 (0.367) 0.149 (0.356) 0.154 (0.361)
200 - 999 employees 0.195 (0.397) 0.205 (0.404) 0.237 (0.425) 0.244 (0.429)
1000 - 1999 employees 0.039 (0.194) 0.039 (0.192) 0.047 (0.211) 0.051 (0.220)
More than 2000 employees (Reference) 0.071 (0.257) 0.110 (0.313) 0.088 (0.284) 0.124 (0.329)
Share of male employees 0.771 (0.201) 0.756 (0.203) 0.463 (0.260) 0.470 (0.251)
Berlin 0.184 (0.387) 0.177 (0.382) 0.212 (0.409) 0.210 (0.407)
Brandenburg, Meck-Pom (Reference) 0.226 (0.418) 0.226 (0.418) 0.211 (0.408) 0.222 (0.416)
Saxony 0.288 (0.453) 0.302 (0.459) 0.276 (0.447) 0.294 (0.456)
Saxony-Anhalt 0.147 (0.354) 0.143 (0.350) 0.135 (0.341) 0.120 (0.324)
Thuringia 0.155 (0.362) 0.152 (0.359) 0.166 (0.372) 0.154 (0.361)
Mining, quarrying 0.009 (0.096) 0.007 (0.086) 0.004 (0.065) 0.004 (0.067)
Manufact: Food 0.033 (0.180) 0.032 (0.177) 0.109 (0.311) 0.083 (0.276)
Manufact: Textiles 0.007 (0.084) 0.005 (0.070) 0.028 (0.165) 0.017 (0.131)
Manufact: Wood 0.019 (0.136) 0.022 (0.145) 0.015 (0.121) 0.012 (0.107)
Publishing, printing 0.013 (0.115) 0.013 (0.114) 0.026 (0.160) 0.022 (0.146)
Manufact: Coke, chemicals 0.022 (0.146) 0.023 (0.148) 0.028 (0.165) 0.028 (0.166)
Manufact: Rubber, plastic 0.023 (0.151) 0.024 (0.152) 0.020 (0.139) 0.023 (0.148)
Manufact: Non-metallic 0.028 (0.166) 0.022 (0.148) 0.016 (0.127) 0.012 (0.108)
Manufact: Metals (Reference) 0.084 (0.277) 0.081 (0.273) 0.035 (0.184) 0.032 (0.177)
Manufact: Machinery 0.063 (0.242) 0.058 (0.234) 0.024 (0.152) 0.021 (0.143)
Manufact: Electr. machinery 0.022 (0.146) 0.024 (0.153) 0.028 (0.166) 0.024 (0.152)
Manufact: Electr. equipment 0.018 (0.135) 0.020 (0.140) 0.017 (0.129) 0.019 (0.135)
Manufact: Instruments 0.014 (0.116) 0.015 (0.120) 0.023 (0.151) 0.027 (0.162)
Manufact: Transport 0.045 (0.206) 0.052 (0.221) 0.018 (0.132) 0.021 (0.144)
Manufact: n.e.c. 0.016 (0.126) 0.014 (0.117) 0.015 (0.123) 0.013 (0.112)
Electricity, gas, water 0.016 (0.125) 0.021 (0.143) 0.012 (0.109) 0.017 (0.128)
Construction 0.233 (0.423) 0.142 (0.349) 0.044 (0.205) 0.024 (0.154)
Auto sales, repair 0.044 (0.205) 0.038 (0.191) 0.023 (0.149) 0.018 (0.134)
Wholesale trade 0.056 (0.231) 0.060 (0.238) 0.066 (0.248) 0.056 (0.229)
Retail trade 0.035 (0.185) 0.035 (0.184) 0.127 (0.333) 0.106 (0.308)
Hotels, restaurants 0.014 (0.116) 0.015 (0.123) 0.040 (0.196) 0.056 (0.230)
Transport 0.028 (0.165) 0.057 (0.232) 0.011 (0.105) 0.029 (0.168)
Auxiliary transport 0.025 (0.155) 0.035 (0.184) 0.016 (0.125) 0.022 (0.146)
Post, telecommunications 0.009 (0.096) 0.011 (0.106) 0.014 (0.120) 0.015 (0.123)
Finance, insurance 0.018 (0.134) 0.020 (0.139) 0.077 (0.266) 0.078 (0.268)
Real estate 0.020 (0.139) 0.035 (0.183) 0.033 (0.179) 0.040 (0.195)
Data processing 0.007 (0.085) 0.006 (0.079) 0.014 (0.118) 0.015 (0.123)
Research, other services 0.078 (0.268) 0.113 (0.317) 0.116 (0.320) 0.168 (0.374)
No. of observations 84,186 140,374 41,762 72,658
Note: All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the La¨nder:
Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung 2001 and Verdienststrukturerhebung 2006, own calculations.
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Table A.5: Probit results males, 2001 and 2006, East
2001 2006
Variable Coeff. (s.e.) Marg. Eff. (s.e.) Coeff. (s.e.) Marg. Eff. (s.e.)
Individual level
Low education 0.278 (0.31) 0.079 (0.009) 0.183 (0.024) 0.052 (0.007)
High education 0.103 (0.021) 0.029 (0.006) -0.114 (0.017) -0.032 (0.005)
Education n/a -0.122 (0.023) -0.034 (0.000) -0.190 (0.021) -0.054 (0.006)
Age -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) -0.003 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)
Tenure 0.035 (0.001) 0.010 (0.000) 0.040 (0.001) 0.011 (0.000)
Firm level
10 - 99 employees -1.905 (0.039) -0.539 (0.011) -1.201 (0.021) -0.339 (0.006)
100 - 199 employees -1.283 (0.041) -0.363 (0.011) -0.710 (0.021) -0.200 (0.006)
200 - 999 employees -0.754 (0.040) -0.213 (0.011) -0.260 (0.020) -0.073 (0.006)
1000 - 1999 employees -0.257 (0.048) -0.073 (0.014) 0.182 (0.029) 0.051 (0.008)
Share of male employees -0.368 (0.043) -0.104 (0.012) 0.497 (0.036) 0.140 (0.010)
Berlin 0.439 (0.019) 0.124 (0.005) -0.272 (0.017) -0.077 (0.005)
Saxony -0.033 (0.020) -0.009 (0.006) 0.064 (0.016) 0.018 (0.005)
Saxony-Anhalt -0.018 (0.021) -0.005 (0.006) 0.033 (0.018) 0.009 (0.005)
Thuringia -0.084 (0.021) -0.024 (0.006) -0.047 (0.016) -0.013 (0.005)
Mining, quarrying 1.134 (0.048) 0.321 (0.013) 1.045 (0.059) 0.295 (0.016)
Manufact: Food 0.159 (0.040) 0.045 (0.011) 0.403 (0.030) 0.114 (0.008)
Manufact: Textiles 0.215 (0.057) 0.061 (0.016) 0.046 (0.068) 0.013 (0.019)
Manufact: Wood 0.111 (0.035) 0.031 (0.010) 0.279 (0.032) 0.079 (0.009)
Publishing, printing 0.274 (0.041) 0.078 (0.012) 0.272 (0.034) 0.077 (0.010)
Manufact: Coke, chemicals 0.870 (0.042) 0.246 (0.012) 0.997 (0.033) 0.281 (0.009)
Manufact: Rubber, plastic 0.101 (0.036) 0.029 (0.010) -0.090 (0.034) -0.025 (0.010)
Manufact: Non-metallic 0.893 (0.034) 0.253 (0.009) 0.675 (0.033) 0.190 (0.009)
Manufact: Machinery 0.241 (0.031) 0.068 (0.009) -0.075 (0.029) -0.021 (0.008)
Manufact: Electr. machinery 0.375 (0.038) 0.106 (0.011) 0.471 (0.031) 0.133 (0.009)
Manufact: Electr. equipment 0.067 (0.039) 0.019 (0.011) -0.395 (0.037) -0.111 (0.010)
Manufact: Instruments 0.080 (0.041) 0.023 (0.012) 0.434 (0.036) 0.122 (0.010)
Manufact: Transport 0.815 (0.032) 0.231 (0.009) 0.684 (0.026) 0.193 (0.007)
Manufact: n.e.c. 0.241 (0.040) 0.068 (0.011) -0.230 (0.045) -0.065 (0.013)
Electricity, gas, water 0.342 (0.052) 0.097 (0.015) 1.762 (0.041) 0.497 (0.011)
Construction 0.398 (0.027) 0.113 (0.008) 0.603 (0.027) 0.170 (0.007)
Auto sales, repair 0.290 (0.035) 0.082 (0.010) -0.499 (0.041) -0.141 (0.012)
Wholesale trade 0.461 (0.034) 0.131 (0.009) 0.445 (0.042) 0.125 (0.012)
Retail trade 0.403 (0.045) 0.114 (0.013) 0.545 (0.044) 0.154 (0.012)
Hotels, restaurants 0.399 (0.048) 0.113 (0.014) 0.777 (0.047) 0.219 (0.013)
Transport 0.080 (0.038) 0.023 (0.011) 0.266 (0.027) 0.075 (0.008)
Auxiliary transport 0.253 (0.036) 0.072 (0.010) -0.214 (0.030) -0.060 (0.008)
Post, telecommunications 1.279 (0.068) 0.362 (0.019) 0.697 (0.035) 0.197 (0.010)
Finance, insurance 1.238 (0.067) 0.350 (0.0019) 1.310 (0.040) 0.370 (0.011)
Real estate -0.508 (0.045) -0.144 (0.013) 0.753 (0.034) 0.213 (0.009)
Data processing 0.330 (0.082) 0.093 (0.023) 1.060 (0.067) 0.299 (0.019)
Research, other services -0.466 (0.036) -0.132 (0.010) 0.829 (0.028) 0.234 (0.008)
Constant 0.046 (0.006) -0.503 (0.006)
No. of observations 84,186 140,374
The table displays average marginal effects. The regression model does not contain any interaction terms.
The standard errors for the marginal effects are obtained from the delta method.
Note: All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the La¨nder:
Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung 2001 and Verdienststrukturerhebung 2006, own calculations.
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Table A.6: Probit results females, 2001 and 2006, East
2001 2006
Variable Coeff. (s.e.) Marg. Eff. (s.e.) Coeff. (s.e.) Marg. Eff. (s.e.)
Individual level
Low education 0.238 (0.041) 0.067 (0.011) 0.191 (0.029) 0.053 (0.008)
High education 0.108 (0.032) 0.030 (0.009) 0.032 (0.024) 0.009 (0.007)
Education n/a -0.054 (0.031) -0.015 (0.009) -0.020 (0.027) -0.006 (0.008)
Age 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000)
Tenure 0.034 (0.001) 0.010 (0.000) 0.037 (0.001) 0.010 (0.000)
Firm level
10 - 99 employees -1.523 (0.049) -0.429 (0.013) -1.142 (0.029) -0.319 (0.007)
100 - 199 employees -0.834 (0.051) -0.235 (0.014) -0.623 (0.028) -0.174 (0.008)
200 - 999 employees -0.332 (0.050) -0.094 (0.014) -0.194 (0.026) -0.054 (0.007)
1000 - 1999 employees 0.091 (0.063) 0.026 (0.018) 0.172 (0.036) 0.048 (0.010)
Share of male employees -0.167 (0.047) -0.047 (0.013) 0.407 (0.042) 0.114 (0.012)
Berlin 0.208 (0.028) 0.059 (0.008) -0.349 (0.024) -0.098 (0.007)
Saxony -0.201 (0.028) -0.057 (0.008) -0.048 (0.023) -0.013 (0.006)
Saxony-Anhalt -0.010 (0.032) -0.003 (0.008) 0.069 (0.025) 0.019 (0.007)
Thuringia -0.313 (0.029) -0.088 (0.008) -0.125 (0.023) -0.035 (0.007)
Mining, quarrying 1.043 (0.096) 0.294 (0.027) 1.344 (0.115) 0.376 (0.032)
Manufact: Food 0.192 (0.054) 0.054 (0.015) 0.356 (0.053) 0.099 (0.015)
Manufact: Textiles 0.090 (0.063) 0.025 (0.018) -0.220 (0.077) -0.062 (0.021)
Manufact: Wood 0.153 (0.062) 0.043 (0.017) 0.475 (0.067) 0.133 (0.019)
Publishing, printing 0.358 (0.058) 0.101 (0.016) 0.397 (0.056) 0.111 (0.016)
Manufact: Coke, chemicals 0.779 (0.064) 0.219 (0.018) 1.004 (0.057) 0.281 (0.016)
Manufact: Rubber, plastic 0.007 (0.066) 0.002 (0.018) 0.043 (0.065) 0.012 (0.018)
Manufact: Non-metallic 0.915 (0.067) 0.258 (0.019) 0.631 (0.070) 0.176 (0.019)
Manufact: Machinery 0.239 (0.074) 0.067 (0.021) 0.146 (0.067) 0.041 (0.019)
Manufact: Electr. machinery 0.305 (0.061) 0.086 (0.017) 0.548 (0.059) 0.153 (0.017)
Manufact: Electr. equipment 0.207 (0.065) 0.058 (0.018) -0.201 (0.064) -0.056 (0.018)
Manufact: Instruments -0.134 (0.063) -0.038 (0.018) 0.261 (0.058) 0.073 (0.016)
Manufact: Transport 0.795 (0.070) 0.224 (0.020) 0.731 (0.059) 0.205 (0.017)
Manufact: n.e.c. 0.113 (0.068) 0.032 (0.019) -0.409 (0.089) -0.114 (0.025)
Electricity, gas, water 0.458 (0.090) 0.129 (0.025) 2.061 (0.073) 0.577 (0.020)
Construction 0.405 (0.067) 0.114 (0.019) 0.747 (0.073) 0.209 (0.020)
Auto sales, repair 0.237 (0.070) 0.067 (0.020) -0.434 (0.082) -0.121 (0.023)
Wholesale trade 0.605 (0.059) 0.170 (0.017) 0.466 (0.069) 0.130 (0.019)
Retail trade 0.768 (0.057) 0.216 (0.016) 0.617 (0.059) 0.173 (0.016)
Hotels, restaurants 0.675 (0.060) 0.190 (0.017) 0.975 (0.059) 0.273 (0.016)
Transport 0.249 (0.083) 0.070 (0.023) 0.598 (0.060) 0.167 (0.017)
Auxiliary transport 0.571 (0.063) 0.161 (0.018) 0.233 (0.057) 0.065 (0.016)
Post, telecommunications 1.345 (0.079) 0.379 (0.022) 0.751 (0.059) 0.210 (0.017)
Finance, insurance 1.677 (0.071) 0.472 (0.020) 1.442 (0.056) 0.404 (0.016)
Real estate -0.022 (0.067) -0.006 (0.019) 0.407 (0.059) 0.114 (0.017)
Data processing 0.369 (0.094) 0.104 (0.027) 1.180 (0.077) 0.330 (0.021)
Research, other services 0.029 (0.059) 0.008 (0.017) 0.581 (0.054) 0.163 (0.015)
Constant 0.177 (0.009) -0.533 (0.008)
No. of observations 41,762 72,658
The table displays average marginal effects. The regression model does not contain any interaction terms.
The standard errors for the marginal effects are obtained from the delta method.
Note: All statistics are weighted by the inverse sampling probability.
Source: Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the La¨nder:
Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung 2001 and Verdienststrukturerhebung 2006, own calculations.7
